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The former president of the EFTA Court, Carl Baudenbacher, lashes out at more or
less the entire Norwegian legal community in his attempt to explain how Norway’s
social security authorities (“NAV”) have come to misinterpret Regulation 883/2004
on the coordination of social security systems for years, and how public prosecutors,
defence lawyers, judges, academics and the EFTA Surveillance Authority all failed
to reveal this. This reply challenges his narrative and attempts to explain how use of
the “room for manoeuvre” that EU/EEA law leaves to the national legislator can very
well be combined with loyal fulfilment of EEA law obligations in an EEA based on the
rule of law.  
According to Mr. Baudenbacher, the failure of Norwegian authorities to recognize
that the right to cash benefits under Norwegian social security law cannot be made
conditional upon the recipients remaining at all times on Norwegian territory, is the
result of a 25 year long campaign by Norwegian lawyers to obstruct the effect of EU/
EEA law in Norway. In his narrative, this ‘collective defensive attitude of scholars,
politicians, bureaucrats, and judges against EEA law’ sets Norway apart not only
from the two other EFTA States in the EEA, Iceland and Liechtenstein, but also from
all of the 28 EU Member States. In short, Norway is a “chauvinist”, anti-European
and generally untrustworthy partner – the worst member of the entire EU/EEA
club. All governments at least since 2008 have officially adopted a “Norway first”-
policy that blatantly violates the principle that obligations flowing from international
treaties are to be fulfilled in good faith. The courts have all somehow accepted this,
so their apparent independence from the other branches of government must be
only a smokescreen. The same is true for Norwegian lawyers who represent private
parties in EEA-law cases against Norwegian authorities, as they neglect their clients’
interest in order to support the government’s anti-European strategy. As marionettes
of the government, the academics at the law faculties are no better (with some very
few exceptions). It is quite an outburst. If even close to correct, it is devastating to
Norway’s rule of law credentials and standing as a credible partner of the EU.   
Countering the narrative
As Mr. Baudenbacher appears to count the EFTA Surveillance Authority among the
institutions captured by the Norwegian government, references to the Authority’s
assessment that Norway generally implements EU-law in a timely and correct
way is unlikely to impress him. Nevertheless, others may be interested to know
that in the Authority’s latest “Internal Market Scoreboard” (July 2019), Norway
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fared quite well – e.g. with a respectable 7th place in the all EU/EEA competition
to transpose directives in time, and with a quite “normal” number of pending
infringement proceedings. Furthermore, the independence of the EFTA Surveillance
Authority vis-à-vis the EEA/EFTA States appear to be generally appreciated by the
European Commission. As the two “watchdogs” cooperate closely (Article 109 EEA
Agreement), there is hardly anyone better positioned to assess the work of the EFTA
Surveillance Authority than the Commission. Thus far, the Commission has not
sounded any alarm.
As to the current NAV scandal more specifically, the EFTA Surveillance Authority
may well be criticised for not having discovered of its own motion that Norwegian
authorities failed to give full effect to Article 21 of Regulation 883/2004 on the
coordination of social security systems. However, thus far there is no evidence
to suggest that the Authority was made aware of the matter and then decided to
look another way. It is important to note that the implementation of the regulation
into Norwegian law was technically correct, and that Norwegian authorities had
assured the EFTA Surveillance Authority that the general rules of Norwegian social
security law was to be set aside to the extent necessary to comply with EU/EEA law
obligations. The problem was “only” that Norwegian authorities failed to recognize
the reach of those obligations.  
If the assessment of the EFTA Surveillance Authority is deemed insufficient,
the conclusions from the most recent meeting of EEA Council (November 2019)
may be of interest. According to those, adopted jointly by the three EEA/EFTA
States and the EU, the EEA Agreement generally works well as “a solid basis for
a broad and strong relationship among the parties”. The recently released minutes
from the previous meeting in May this year points in the same direction. As in
previous meetings, the EU representatives certainly do not brush the challenges
to the continued success of the EEA Agreement under the carpet, but Norway
systematically undermining the effect of EEA law is not on the list. The same is true
for the EU Council’s most recent conclusions on the Union’s relations with non-
EU Western European countries (December 2018), where it is stressed that the
“excellent” relationship between Norway and the EU is based on shared values,
“notably respect for human rights and democratic principles”. If compared to recent
EU assessments of the rule of law credentials of some of the EU’s own member
states, one may question whether Norway really is the worst member of the entire
family.
Further, if Mr. Baudenbacher’s narrative was correct, one should expect an influx of
complaints against Norwegian authorities to the EFTA Surveillance Authority, to the
Commission, to the European Court of Human Rights etc., at least from foreigners
represented by non-Norwegian lawyers. However, no such development has been
reported.
As to the national courts, it is true that their relationship to the EFTA Court has not
always been the best. The lack of referrals from Norwegian courts to the EFTA Court
has been criticized, even by some of us chauvinist professors, and this seems to
have had some effect. Indeed, if due account is taken to the size of the country and
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the caseload of the Supreme Court, the number of referrals from the justices in Oslo
in the last couple of years compare favourably with those of the highest court of
several EU Member States. 
It is also true that there have been a few occasions on which Norwegian courts
have disagreed with the interpretation of EEA law advocated by the EFTA Court
in an advisory opinion, but only in cases where it could reasonably be argued that
so would the CJEU if asked to rule on the same matter. It is important to stress
here that the jurisdiction of the EFTA Court differs from that of the CJEU, as the
EEA/EFTA States were only willing to let the EFTA Court answer questions from
national courts by way of advisory opinions (with the EU accepting this). Opinions
may well differ as to whether Norwegian courts or the EFTA Court “got it right” in
these few cases of disagreement, but it cannot reasonably be considered a rule
of law problem that a national court exercises its constitutional right to disagree
with an advisory opinion. It may be added that the number of CJEU judgments
diverging from interpretations of common EU/EEA rules previously advocated by the
EFTA Court, easily exceeds those (very few) from Norwegian courts. The judicial
architecture of the EEA is complicated and by no means perfect, but as long as
all courts involved apply the same methodology and engage with each other in an
open and constructive dialogue, any remaining disagreements will be well within the
boundaries of the rule of law.
As to binding judgments from the EFTA Court, e.g. in infringement proceedings
brought by the EFTA Surveillance Authority, they have always been complied with
by Norway, albeit sometimes with little enthusiasm and on a few occasions rather
late. A quick look at CJEU case-law reveals several similar cases from various
EU member states, and also quite a few examples of rather more serious non-
compliance. That is certainly no excuse for Norwegian authorities in the cases where
they have taken too long to react, but it does considerable harm to the “worst in
class”-narrative presented by Mr. Baudenbacher.
The same is true if one has a closer look at EEA law cases in Norwegian courts. The
principle of State liability for violations of EEA law, one of the examples mentioned
by Baudenbacher, was not only acknowledged unanimously by the full Supreme
Court back in 2005 (HR-2005-01690-P); the majority also held the breach in question
to be sufficiently serious, thus paving the way for an approach to later such cases
that cannot in any way be describes as “State friendly”. The experiences with State
liability cases in certain other EU/EEA member states appear to be more mixed, to
say the least.
False equations and insufficient differentiation
As to the application of the EU/EEA law principle of proportionality, another category
highlighted by Mr. Baudenbacher, it is true that Norwegian courts have sometimes
struggled with its application. This, however, cannot justify a “worst in class” label. A
comparison with the other Nordic EU/EEA member states reveals similar challenges,
and it is hardly a bold claim that there are examples of national courts also in
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other parts of the EEA that have found the EU/EEA law principle of proportionality
challenging.
Part of the reason for the characterization of the NAV case as a scandal, is that there
is evidence to suggest that the social security authorities for quite some time decided
not to appeal unfavourable decisions from the Social Security Tribunal in order to
keep the disputed legal question out of the higher courts. If proven, it is indeed an
affront to the rule of law which must have consequences for those responsible. It
does not, however, fit Mr. Baudenbacher’s narrative of captured Norwegian courts.
If the judges all adhere to a “Norway first” dogma, surely the authorities would have
nothing to fear from letting the Court of Appeal rule on the matter?    
The fundamental flaw with Mr. Baudenbacher’s outburst is that he believes the
so-called “room for manoeuvre” policy to be a legal concept. As professor Hans
Petter Graver tries to explain in his comment to Baudenbacher’s post, it is not. No
Norwegian government have ever claimed that a wish to protect the Norwegian
legislator’s “room for manoeuvre” is in itself a valid legal argument of relevance to
the interpretation of EEA law, nor have any Norwegian court considered it as such.
General references to the EU law principle of subsidiarity may perhaps have been
made, but that can hardly be characterised as chauvinist.
Contrary to Mr. Baudenbacher’s claim, Norwegian authorities’ desire to protect the
room for national policies that EU/EEA law leaves to the Member States, is very
much in line with the rule of law. In fact, much more so than the alternative, which
would be to introduce a kind of “safety margin” in all EEA-related matters, to the
detriment of the democratically elected legislator.
The name of the policy, in particular in the English translation, is perhaps not the
best, as it can be misunderstood to be more than it is: An advice to parliament to
1) enact the laws parliament wants to enact, as long as parliament itself (with the
help of the experts in the ministries) sincerely believe those laws to be in line with
Norway’s EEA law obligations, and to 2) defend such laws in the courts.   
Mr. Baudenbacher’s claim that no other EU/EEA member state does the same
is quite simply wrong. Anyone following the case-law of the CJEU will be able to
come up with numerous cases where various EU member states have enacted, and
then defended, national rules that the Commission and/or private parties consider
to violate EU law. A comparison of the positions defended by the Norwegian
government before the EFTA Court (or before national courts) and those defended
by the governments of various EU member states before the CJEU, does not in any
way support a claim that Norway is a particularly stubborn defendant that wastes
the courts’ time with attempts to save national rules that clearly violate EU/EEA
law (and that therefore should never have been enacted in the first place). It may
well be, however, that no other government has felt the need to give this approach
to EU/EEA law a particular name. After all, it is no more than a combination of the
principles of democracy and legality in an EEA based on the rule of law.
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Focusing on the actual problems
Still, as pointed out by professor Graver in his post on the NAV scandal, application
of national laws that test the reach of EU/EEA law does raise questions of legal
certainty and effective judicial protection for the individuals involved. This calls for
transparency, guidance of private parties and affordable access to the courts, in
particular in cases involving ordinary citizens. It also calls for an understanding of the
courts as the authorities’ best friends in a common mission to honour the obligations
that flow from the EEA Agreement. Thus, in the NAV case, rather than trying to
avoid the courts, the social security authorities should from the very beginning have
informed persons wishing to travel abroad whilst receiving cash benefits from NAV
that the interpretation of the EEA rule in question was not obvious, provided legal
aid in a test case and then seized the opportunity to let the courts decide the matter.
If the government were to clarify that this is the approach to follow in the future,
parliament’s “room for manoeuvre” can very well be combined with loyal fulfilment of
EEA law obligations in an EEA based on the rule of law.
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